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Abstract. We propose Lockcoin, a secure and privacy-preserving mix
service for bitcoin anonymity. We introduce mix servers to provide mix
service for user to prevent attackers linking the input address with output
address by using blind signature shceme, multisignature scheme. Lock-
coin provides anonymity, scalability, bitcoin compatibillity, theft impos-
sibility and accountability. We have proposed a prototype of Lockcoin
based on bitcoin test network, experimental results show that our solu-
tion is efficient. Lockcoin’s source codes are released on github.com/Nor
theastern-University-Blockchain/Lockcoin.
Keywords: blind signature · multi-singature · privacy-preserving.
1 Introduction
In 2008, a paper named A peer-to-peer electronic cash system [1] was published
by Nakamoto Satoshi, who opened a new era of digital currency. By sep 2018,
about 17 million bitcoins had been issued with market cap reaching $1.25 billion
[2].
However, as bitcoin is an open ledger, the transaction is collected and stored
in the blockchain, and anyone can view the information on it. Bitcoin can only
provide pseudonyms, not anonymity. Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir [3] download
the full history of bitcoin and analyze many statistical properties of its asso-
ciated transaction graph. Regal Reid and Martin Harrigan [4] can prove that
multiple pseudonymous addresses can be linked to a single user. Philip Koshy et
al. [5] demonstrate the approach to map bitcoin addresses directly to IP address.
Andrew Miller et al. [6] introduce AddressProbe, a technique to discover bitcoins
public topology and influential nodes.
Therefore, there is an urgent need for providing bitcoin users a full anonymous
service. Bonneau et al. [7] propose a protocol Mixcoin to introduce mix service for
bitcoin, which wants to avoid the link between the input address and the output
address. Luke Valenta and Brendan Rowan put forward the Blindcoin [8] protocol
by improving the Mixcoin protocol, it uses blind signature to guarantee that
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mix server cannot know the link from input/output address. Gregory Maxwell
propose Coinjoin [9] to shuffle the link of users address without a third party.
However, it is susceptible to DoS attacks. Coinswap [10] is another proposal of
Gregory Maxwell which uses a third party to assist in trading, its anonymity
depends on 2-of-2 escrow transactions. Van Saberhagen proposes to use ring
signatures and stealth address technologies to build an anonymous higher e-
cash program CryptoNote [11]. The verification complexity of the ring signature
increases linearly with the anonymity provided. Zerocoin [12] proposes a new
type of side chain, zerocoin to provide anonymity for bitcoin. It is compatible
with bitcoin, but it has low system efficiency and performance. Zerocash [13]
improves on Zerocoin by using zk-SNARKs Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
algorithm [14] to achieve stronger anonymity. However, its security depends on
the honest destruction of the system’s secret parameters.
Our contribution. In this paper, we propose Lockcoin on the basis of Mixcoin
[7] and Blindcoin [8]. We propose a new mix service by using multi-signatures
to prevent mix server stealing bitcoins from users. It has anonymity, scalability,
bitcoin compatibility, theft impossibility and accountability. Lockcoin has the
properties which an ideal solution should have. We also implemented Lockcoin
in Golang language and performed the experiment. By using parallel strategy,
experimental results show that our solution is efficient.
2 Background
2.1 Ideal property
For solving the privacy problem of bitcoin, an ideal solution should consider the
following properties. See section 4.1 for comparisons.
Anonymity: The user should be the only entity that knows the link from
input address to output address.
Scalability: The system should have good scalability to scale to numerous
users.
Bitcoin compatibility: The system should be compatible with the current
bitcoin system.
Theft impossibility: No party can steal bitcoin from other accounts.
Accountability (mix service only): When the protocol does not work properly,
both parties can get a proof of the misconduct.
2.2 Blind signatures
Blind signature was introduced by David Chaum [15]. It is a form of digital
signature. The content of a message is blinded before it is signed. The result of
blind signature can be publicly verified against the original. Blind signature can
also be used to provide unlinkability, which prevents the signer from linking the
blinded message to a later un-blinded version. Blind signature schemes can be
implemented using a number of common public key signing schemes, for instance
RSA [16] and DSA [17].
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2.3 Multi-signature
Multi-signature [18] is a digital signature scheme which allows a group of users to
sign a single transaction. It needs multiple parties to work together to complete
the signing process. These parties can be people, institutions or programmed
scripts [19].
In this paper, a 2-of-2 multi-signature will be used, which means that the
assets on the multi-signature address belongs to two users. Only if both two
users have signed the transaction, the bitcoin on the multi-signature address
can be used.
3 Lockcoin protocol
3.1 System model
Our model proposes a protocol based on the mix service which requires mix
server, the users and public log. Fig.1 shows the whole model diagram. For
understanding, we only take a user’s operations as an example. A = Alice (a
user), M = mix server in the following. Parameter table is shown in Tab.1.
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Fig. 1. model diagram
Mix server. It receives one-chunk (one-chunk means the amount of bitcoin
must be the same for all users participating in the mix service each time) money
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from user’s input address, and it puts one-chunk into user’s output address, the
model assumes that there are multiple competing mix servers, which has the
corresponding Mpub, Mpriv.
The users. The user wants to transfer funds from the input address which
might associate with her real identity, and she can receive the same money in
her new address. Also, user needs to pay the money laundering charges for this
purpose.
Public log. Public log can be viewed as the bulletin board that can only be
added but can not be modified. In fact, it can be viewed as a bitcoin transaction
OP RETURN [20] which needs to consume little bitcoins.
Table 1. Parameter table.
Parameters Description
kin the input address of A.
kout the output address of A.
kesc M generates a fresh escrow address.
k′esc the Ms escrow address from some previous transaction.
kA kA is used to generate the address of 2-of-2 kAM.
kM kM is used to generate the address of 2-of-2 kAM.
kAM A and M co-generate 2-of-2 signature address.
k′in A’s address for payment to the A and M common address kAM.
A′ an anonymous identity that A can use to post to the public log.
Mpub the public key of M.
Mpriv the private key of M.
AC a secret commitment/encryption function of A.
A′C the inverse of AC.
ω the number of blocks which is required to confirm payment.
z the deposit ratio.
v the chunk size.
ρ the mixing fee rate that A will pay.
D the mix parameters, a tuple { v,t1,t2,t3,t4,t5,t6,t7,ω,z,ρ,kA }.
3.2 Protocol process
The entire protocol flow is shown below.
(1) M announces its expected range of values on the bulletin board, where z is
the deposit ratio, v is the chunk size to be mixed, ω is the number of blocks which
is required to confirm payment. We will discuss how to set these parameters in
section 3.3.
(2) A sends the protocol parameters to M, 〈D=(v,t1,t2,t3,t4,t5,t6,t7,ω,z,ρ,kA),
[kout]AC〉. Among them, (v,t1,t2,t3,t4,t5,t6,t7,ω,z,ρ,kA) are disclosed, and kout is
blinded, and the information is processed using the AC blindness factor (only A
know the inverse A′C).
Lockcoin: a secure and privacy-preserving mix service for bitcoin anonymity 5
(3a) M uses kA from A and kM address which is generated by itself to generate
2-of-2 multi-signature address kAM, and then it uses its own private key to sign
{[kout]AC, kesc, kAM, D}.
(3b) If the mix server rejects the request sent from A, the protocol will
terminate, A will delete the output address.
(4) A transfers deposit vz from k′in to kAM before t1 time.
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Fig. 2. protocol diagram
(5a) M checks the bitcoin record for whether the transactions in the step 4
are confirmed by ω blocks. If confirmed, M uses the private key to sign [kout]AC
and sends it to public log before t2 time.
(5b) If M refuses to proceed with the protocol and does not enter step 5a, A
will announce the evidence, which includes {[kout]AC, kesc, kAM, D}Mpriv, the
transaction (vz, k′in, kAM). Anyone can view the [kout]AC that did not send a
signature to public log. So it can be judged that M violates the protocol. But
in our protocol, in the case of both sides are rational, almost no such situation,
because if M violates the protocol it won’t get any benefits.
(6) When A knows the information in the public log, A will use A′C to
unblind {[kout]AC}Mpriv to generate {kout}Mpriv information, and then through
anonymous network (such as Tor [21]) sent to public log by t3 time. Therefore,
6 F. Author et al.
M can only view its signature on kout address, but it can not know the user
corresponding kin address.
(7a) M finds the signature kout address in step 6 on public log and transfers
v bitcoins from k′esc to kout within t4 time.
(7b) If M does not transfer v to kout, A will execute the same operations as
step 5b.
(8a) After ω blocks, A confirms that kout address received M’s v bitcoins,
she will transfer v bitcoins from kin to kesc by t5 time.
(8b) If A does not transfer v to kesc, then mix server need to increase z
to prevent such malicious attackers. For mix server, it will lose v bitcoins. For
attackers, they’ll lose (zv-v) bitcoins, so neither of the parties hopes it happens.
(9) A constructs a transaction that transfers vρ bitcoins from the (zv) bitcoins
in the 2-of-2 multi-signature address to A’s k′in, and the other (zv-vρ) bitcoins
is transferred to the k′M, and A sends the transaction to M before t6 time.
(10a) M signs the transaction constructed by step 9 to form the transaction
{vρ → M, (vz - vρ) → A}σA,σM, and then M sends it to the bitcoin network
to complete the entire protocol process.
(10b) If M does not sign, A will announce {[kout]AC, kesc, kAM, D}Mpriv
and transaction{vρ→M, (vz-vρ)→A}σA and issue her own transaction hash in
step 4 and 8a. Anyone can verify whether the M violates the protocol. In our
protocol, in the case of M is rational, this will not happen. Since the bitcoins in
kAM could not be used without the signature of both two parties.
3.3 Parameter setting
The purpose of parameter z is that we hope that the mix server will be able to
adjust the size of the deposit dynamically according to the actual needs of the
market. If it is too small, there may be malicious competitors who will continue
to participate in the protocol by executing only to step 7a. If too large, user
would like to choose a mix server which needs small deposit. v, ρ and ω have
been discussed in Mixcoin [7].
4 Analysis and performance
In this section, properties, overheads and fees of Lockcoin will be discussed by
comparing them with other schemes. We also have proposed a prototype of
Lockcoin based on bitcoin network.
4.1 Properties
Lockcoin contains properties which an ideal solution should have, the properties
comparison result is shown in Tab.2.
Anonymity. The anonymity of Lockcoin is provided by blind signature, which
makes it impossible to link the input address and the output address. For an
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attacker, they can only obtain the bitcoin block transaction information and
public log information, and it is unable to figure out the link.
Scalability. As the introduction of mix server, Lockcoin can provide services
that correspond with market needs. It is efficient to add more users to mix service
since users interact only with the centralized mix servers and not a single one.
Further, if there is a single point of failure in a mix server, it is easily for user
to turn to other different servers.
Bitcoin compatibility. The whole protocol acts as a service on bitcoin, so it
is compatible with bitcoin system.
Resilience to DoS attack. Different from the Coinjoin. Due to the related
fees, the DoS attack on the mix server will bring a great economic burden on
the attacker, so Lockcoin can resist this attack.
Theft impossibility. Due to the security deposit by using 2-of-2 multi-signature,
the server can not steal the deposit as it can not obtian the signature from user.
Transfering the money to earn the mix fees is the best choice for the server.
Accountability. When one party violates the protocol, all b operations in
section 3.2 can ensure the protocol is properly accountable, each one can take
the proof to prove the violation party really did.
In the literature [22], each properties has been discussed between every main-
stream schemes [7–10,12,13]. For accountability, Mixcoin [7], Blindcoin [8], Lock-
coin can all present a proof of the mix servers misconduct. For scalability, because
of introducing mix servers, Mixcoin [7], Blindcoin [8] and Lockcoin can easily re-
sist to DoS attack. Coinjoin [9] will be easily broken by malicious participants.
For Coinswap [10], as it is a p2p service, it does not have DoS attack problem.
For Zerocoin [12] and Zerocash [13], their design can be resistance to DoS attack.
Table 2. Comparison of the properties with other schemes.
Accountability Scalability Architecture bitcoin
compatible
Resilience to
DoS attack
Theft
impossible
Lockcoin ! ! service ! ! !
Mixcoin [7] ! ! service ! ! #
Blindcoin [8] ! ! service ! ! #
Coinjoin [9] - weak - ! # !
Coinswap [10] - # p2p ! ! partly
Zerocoin [12] - ! altcoin # ! !
Zerocash [13] - ! altcoin # ! !
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4.2 Overheads and fees
The overheads and fees comparison result is shown in Tab.3.
Overheads. A successful Lockcoin mixing operation requires three message di-
rectly between A and M, two messages posted to the public log, three normal
bitcoin transactions and one multi-signature transaction. So, 6 transaction traffic
are needed in the bitcoin network in total.
Fees. Posting messages to the public log costs extra fees, in addition to the fees
paid for the funds transfer. According to [11], the typical transaction fee rate
is 0.0001 BTC per 1000 bytes. Although the exact message size depends on the
implementation, we believe 5000 bytes is a reasonable estimate, for a total cost
per message of 0.0005 BTC per message. Overall, the financial cost to a user is
composed of the mixing fee and the transaction fees. For a chunk size of 0.1 BTC,
a fee rate of 0.01, and a transaction fee of 0.0005 BTC per message, the total
cost to the user is around 0.002 BTC or 2%, which we believe is a reasonable
price to pay for the anonymity benefits.
Table 3. Comparison of the consume with other schemes.
Traffic Fee Rounds Time
Lockcoin 6 transactions vρ one round 10×ω×6 mins
Mixcoin [7] 2 transactions vρ×round Multiple rounds 10×ω×2×round mins
Blindcoin [8] 4 transactions vρ one round 10×ω×4 mins
Coinjoin [9] 1 transaction - one round Negotiation+1h
Coinswap [10] 4 transactions - one round 10×ω×4 mins
4.3 Performance
The experiment was performed at a Dell desktop machine having an Intel Core
i5-6500 CPU at 3.20GHz and 4.00G of RAM and running 64-bit windows 10.
The program is implemented by Golang language and runs on the bitcoin test
network. We use a parallel strategy to simulate multiple users and test the
runtime to mix bitcoins in different numbers of users. Without considering the
bitcoin block confirmation time, the time each user spends participating in the
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mix server is around 0.1-0.2 s. Experimental results are shown in Fig.3 and Fig.4.
The relevant source code was uploaded to github3.
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time of the program and the number of users.
 !  !"  !#  !$  !%  !&  !'  !(  !)  !* "! 
 ! 
 !"
 !#
 !$
 !%
 !&
 !'
 !(
 !)
 !*
"! 
 !  !"  !#  !$  !%  !&  !'  !(  !)  !* "! 
 ! 
 !"
 !#
 !$
 !%
 !&
 !'
 !(
 !)
 !*
"! 
 
 
 
!
"
#
$
%
&
'
(
#
(
)
#
$
"
*
%
'
+
'
+
,
#
-
.
"
$
.
 !"#$%&'(#()#$*+&',"
 !"#$" % &'
 !"#$" % ('
 !"#$" % )'
 !"#$" % &*'
Fig. 4. The complementary cumulative distri-
bution function of running states in different
users.
5 Conclusion
We present Lockcoin, a secure and privacy-preserving mix service for bitcoin
anonymity. Lockcoin uses blind signature to prevent the link between user’s in-
put address and output address. Multi-signature can be used as a deposit mech-
anism, which is already a funcion that bitcoin system has achieved. Lockcoin has
all the proporties that the ideal scheme should have, such as anonymity, scalabil-
ity, bitcoin compatibillity, theft impossibility and accountability. Meanwhile, we
implemented the prototype of Lockcoin, experiments prove that it can support
large-scale users and also it is very efficient.
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